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University of Richmond and
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
This chapter will discuss real-time forecasting in a macroeconomic 
policy context. I will begin by talking about the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF), a survey of private-sector forecasters. Next, I will 
discuss research on real-time data analysis and its importance in fore-
casting. Finally, I will discuss real-time forecasting in the 1990s.
In a policy environment, such as the one I faced for 14 years at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, you have three basic choices 
for developing forecasts in a real-time forecasting environment. One 
possibility, used by many policy analysts, is simply to rely on forecasts 
made by others, such as the consulting fi rm Macroeconomic Advisors. 
After all, forecasting fi rms devote considerable resources to forecast-
ing, so why not trust their forecasts? An alternative is to look at surveys 
of forecasters, such as the SPF. This gives you a range of forecasts, and 
you can base your decisions on the median forecast, which is usually a 
better forecast than the forecast provided by any individual forecaster. 
The third possibility is to create your own forecasting model. This gives 
you the ability to tweak the forecast to your own needs and to specify 
your own baseline underlying the forecast. You can do some simple 
things such as I did at the Fed—for instance, forecasting GDP for the 
current quarter based on the employment data that are released early in 
the month. Or you can run time-series models of your own specifi ca-
tion, which often hold their own against much larger, more sophisti-
cated models. Or, you could buy a large-model forecasting software 
program, such as the one provided by Macroeconomic Advisors, and 
then modify some of its assumptions to your own liking to produce 
your own forecast based on its model structure. Unless you have many 
resources at your disposal, however, you probably do not want to pro-
duce a large-model forecast on your own. You are unlikely to do better 
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than others, and almost certain to produce much worse forecasts, unless 
you have a large number of economists working on it, such as the doz-
ens that work on forecasting at the Federal Reserve Board.
The major concern that you should have about all these forecasting 
models is the role of judgment in the outcome of the forecasting exer-
cise. The more you study forecasting, the more you realize how much 
impact judgment has—there is no such thing as a pure model forecast. 
First, there is judgment in determining what model to use. Second, there 
is judgment about the underlying key parameters of the model: how do 
you determine the natural rate of unemployment, or the growth rate of 
potential GDP, or the equilibrium real interest rate, which are generally 
not determined within a model? Those factors tend to drive the forecast 
much more than you might think.
THE SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS
My own involvement with forecasting began in 1990 with a research 
paper in which I wanted to get data on infl ation expectations. I used 
a survey that was run by the American Statistical Association and the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and was known as the 
Economic Outlook Survey. The survey contained much useful informa-
tion, and I was impressed that the survey had begun in 1968 and was 
the longest quarterly survey of forecasters in existence. But shortly after 
using the survey myself, I read an announcement that the survey was 
folding because of lack of interest and because there was no organiza-
tion that was willing to run it. As an economist at the Federal Reserve, I 
thought the survey was incredibly useful—it gave great insight into the 
expectations of the country’s leading forecasters. I was determined that 
the survey should not die, and so I contacted Robert Allison of the NBER 
and Victor Zarnowitz of the University of Chicago about the possibility 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia taking over the survey. They 
were both enthusiastic about having an institution like the Fed running 
the survey, and so we took over, missing only one quarterly survey in the 
transition.
After taking over the survey, I, along with my coresearcher Leonard 
Mills, began to rehabilitate it. We renamed it the Survey of Professional 
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Forecasters. We increased the number of participants (the participant list 
was down to 13 forecasters when we took it over), tightened procedures 
for production of the survey results, and added questions to increase the 
value of the survey to researchers and to policymakers. Today, the sur-
vey is used to provide forecasts to policymakers before the meetings of 
the Federal Open Market Committee, as well as to provide a solid data-
base of historical forecasts for use by macroeconomic researchers. The 
Philadelphia Fed’s Web site provides complete details on the survey’s 
history and all the individual responses to each survey, as well as write-
ups for each survey and both median and mean data across forecasters 
for each macroeconomic variable included in the survey.1
If people wish to use a forecast, or a survey of forecasts, for mak-
ing decisions, they would like to feel confi dent that the survey provides 
valid forecasts. Hence, much research has been done on the accuracy 
of forecasts from surveys, including the SPF. Two standard tests of the 
accuracy of forecasts are tests of 1) unbiasedness (that forecast errors 
have a zero mean over long periods) and 2) effi ciency (that forecast 
errors are uncorrelated with information known when the forecast was 
made). If forecasts are unbiased and effi cient, then people are likely to 
fi nd them useful. If forecasts are biased or ineffi cient, then it should be 
possible for someone to improve on the forecasts in real time.
SPF forecasts generally pass the tests of unbiasedness—forecasts 
are unbiased in long samples. However, over short periods, the forecasts 
might have persistent errors. Figure 2.1 provides an example of SPF fore-
casts of infl ation (based on the GDP defl ator) compared with the measure 
of the infl ation rate that is released one month after the end of the quarter.2 
In the short run, the forecasts sometimes exhibit patterns in which fore-
cast errors persist for some time. But, as I point out (Croushore 2010), 
forecasters adapt fairly quickly to structural changes in the economy that 
lead to short-run persistence of forecast errors, and before long the errors 
disappear. If the forecasts were perfectly accurate, all the points would 
lie on the 45-degree line in Figure 2.1. Although many points are off the 
45-degree line, on average over the 35 years of data shown here, the plot-
ted points lie fairly symmetrically around that line.
Most research also shows that the SPF forecasts pass tests for effi -
ciency. However, there are exceptions. Some of the exceptions found in 
the literature are not valid because although they show that the forecast 
errors are correlated with another variable, they don’t use the data that 
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the forecasters had at the time they made their forecasts. Instead, those 
studies use revised data, which the forecasters would not have had, so 
their tests are not really tests of effi ciency.
Ball and Croushore (2003) show that there is a tendency for fore-
cast errors to be correlated with changes in monetary policy. As Figure 
2.2 shows, SPF output forecast errors are negatively associated with 
changes in the real federal funds interest rate. When the Fed tightens 
monetary policy (and thus the real federal funds rate increases), fore-
casters reduce their forecasts for output growth, but not by enough. 
As a result, output growth falls more than the forecasters expect, and 
thus there is a negative relationship between output forecast errors and 
changes in the real federal funds rate.
For the most part, though, despite the Ball-Croushore fi ndings, the 
forecast errors in the SPF tend to be small. The survey’s forecasts are 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data from the SPF and the Real-Time Data Set 
for Macroeconomists, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Figure 2.1  SPF Forecasts versus One-Quarter-Later Actuals
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generally better than simple univariate time-series models at short hori-
zons, as Stark (2010) notes in a recent review of the forecast accuracy 
of the SPF. However, there are some imperfections in the survey fore-
casts, especially for long horizons and with respect to the survey’s effi -
ciency in responding to changes in monetary policy.
REAL-TIME DATA
In evaluating forecasts of macroeconomic variables, researchers 
must be aware of data revisions. Some researchers are not careful about 
this issue, so they grab data from the current database and perform tests 
on forecasts as if the data in their database were the same as the data 
that were available to researchers in real time. This is a dangerous and 
invalid practice. Many papers have been written that show that some 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data from the SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia; and the FRED database, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Figure 2.2  Output Forecast Errors and Change in Real Federal 
Funds Rate
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new model or other provides better forecasts than the SPF, but in most 
cases the forecasting advantage comes because the researcher is com-
paring forecasts from a model using a recent data set to forecasts made 
by the SPF forecasters using a completely different data set. Of course, 
the two sets of forecasts are not comparable.
To be able to compare forecasts made with a new model to the SPF 
forecasts in a legitimate manner, one would need to have at one’s dis-
posal a real-time database, showing what the data looked like at the 
time the SPF forecasters were making their forecasts. This is, in fact, the 
purpose of the Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, which Tom 
Stark and I developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. (See Croushore 
and Stark [2000, 2001] for details.) The data set was developed at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and new variables are continu-
ously being added to the data set, based on work that continues at the 
Philadelphia Fed and work that my students have completed at the Uni-
versity of Richmond. A database of this nature needs good institutional 
support, as it is a public good. The Federal Reserve is a natural institu-
tion for supporting such projects, as it falls under the domain of provid-
ing macroeconomic data to the public for no charge.
Following the success of the Real-Time Data Set for Macroecono-
mists, other real-time databases have been developed all over the world. 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis developed 
the ALFRED database, keeping successive vintages of the FRED (Fed-
eral Reserve Economic Data) database and making the data available 
in a convenient form. The Bureau of Economic Analysis has also, since 
2002, kept all the vintages of its Excel fi les containing National Income 
and Product Accounts data and made that data available. The OECD 
now has a large real-time data set containing data for all the countries in 
the OECD, and the Euro Area Business Cycle Network recently made 
a real-time database available for all the countries in the Euro area. The 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Japan also maintain their own real-
time databases.3
Some government statistical agencies in some countries have been 
reluctant to help researchers develop real-time data sets: they fear that if 
data revisions are examined by researchers, the statistical agencies will 
be subject to criticism because of systematic revisions. But research 
on data revisions is not intended to be critical of those agencies. The 
research fi ndings might help the agencies strengthen their procedures 
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to avoid having predictable revisions, for example. Economists under-
stand that data agencies have limited resources and cannot produce per-
fect data releases given their constraints. The goal of research is to help 
people understand the limitations of the data and to explore the implica-
tions of those revisions for structural macroeconomic modeling, fore-
casting, and policy analysis. In addition, data revisions often refl ect new 
information that cannot be known any earlier. For example, tax returns 
give the government statistical agencies much better data on income 
for the preceding year than the agencies had during that year, so GDP 
and income statistics are improved dramatically. Or, take the example 
of infl ation measures: by construction, the consumer price index is not 
revised (except for changes in the seasonal pattern), whereas the per-
sonal consumption expenditures price index is revised; yet the latter is 
a much superior measure of infl ation precisely because the revisions 
refl ect changes in weights applied to different sectors that provide a 
more accurate view of the economy.
The typical structure of real-time data sets is shown in the data 
matrix in Table 2.1, which illustrates real-time data on real U.S. out-
put. Each column reports a data vintage—that is, the date at which the 
data are observed. So, the column labeled “Nov. 1965” tells you what 
someone in November 1965 would have observed at the time. Each 
row shows the data for a date for which real output is measured. Thus 
the upper left value of 306.4 (in billions of real dollars) is the value 
for real output in the fi rst quarter of 1947 as someone in November 
1965 would have observed in the government’s database. As you move 
across a given row in the table, you see how data are revised. For exam-
ple, in November 1965, the fi rst release of the data on real output for 
1965Q3 was 609.1 (as before, in billions of real dollars). That number 
was revised to 613.0 in the data set of February 1966 and remained at 
that level in the data set of May 1966. The large increase seen in later 
vintages of the data of 3636.3 is not because of revisions to data but 
because of changes in the base year, from 1958 in the vintages of 1965 
and 1966, to a base year of 2005 in vintages of 2009 and 2010. Mov-
ing down the main diagonal of the table, we see that the last recorded 
observation in each column shows the initial release of the data for each 
date: 609.1 for 1965Q3, 621.7 for 1965Q4, 633.8 for 1966Q1, 13,014.0 
for 2009Q3, 13,155.0 for 2009Q4, and 13,254.7 for 2010Q1.
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If data revisions were small and random, we would not worry about 
them affecting the structural modeling, forecasting, and policy analysis. 
But a look at the revisions should convince you that the revisions may 
be large and consequential. For example, Figure 2.3 shows the revisions 
to real output growth for the fi rst quarter of 1977. From the data set’s 
initial release at 5.2 percent, it was revised upward a few months later to 
7.5 percent, and ultimately was revised upward as high as 9.6 percent. 
But later it was revised down as low as 4.7 percent in the benchmark 
revision of July 2010. So the revisions can be large and can occur even 
three decades after the fi rst release of the data for a particular date.
You might think that such large revisions are rare and affect output 
growth for just one quarter, but even in the long run, data revisions can 
be large. For instance, if you average real output growth over fi ve-year 
periods, you will fi nd large revisions, which could potentially affect 
your view of long-run economic growth. As Table 2.2 shows, however, 
the fi ve-year growth rate can be revised by as much as 0.6 percentage 
points, which is a large revision for a growth rate that is as low as 1.9 
percent. For example, the growth rate in the fi rst half of the 1970s was 
initially released as 2.1 percent, but by 1999 it was revised upward to 
2.6 percent, nearly a 25 percent increase.
Table 2.1  Data Matrix for Real U.S. Output (billions of real dollars)
Vintage Nov. 1965 Feb. 1966 May 1966 Nov. 2009 Feb. 2010 May 2010
Quarter
1947Q1 306.4 306.4 306.4 1,772.2 1,772.2 1,772.2
1947Q2 309.0 309.0 309.0 1,769.5 1,769.5 1,769.5
1947Q3 309.6 309.6 309.6 1,768.0 1,768.0 1,768.0
1965Q3 609.1 613.0 613.0 3,636.3 3,636.3 3,636.3
1965Q4 621.7 624.4 3,724.0 3,724.0 3,724.0
1966Q1 633.8 3,815.4 3,815.4 3,815.4
2009Q2 12,901.5 12,901.5 12,901.5
2009Q3 13,014.0 12,973.0 12,973.0
2009Q4 13,155.0 13,149.5
2010Q1 13,254.7
SOURCE: Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia.
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In modeling data revisions, a key question for which an answer is 
needed for modeling or forecasting is whether the data revisions can 
be modeled as providing news or reducing noise. Data revisions that 
provide news are those that come about when the government’s data 
releases are optimal forecasts of later releases. Under that situation, 
data revisions will not be predictable in advance from data known (by 
anyone) at the time the data are released. Providing such data revisions 
requires the government statistical agency to not report its sample infor-
mation alone, but to use judgment and forecasting models to optimally 
forecast the values of missing data, so that the data release is an optimal 
forecast of later data releases. However, often data releases are not con-
structed in this manner, but rather fi ll in the missing source data with 
forecasts in such a way that the data release is not an optimal forecast 
of later data releases—usually because today’s data release is correlated 
with other data known at the time. In such a situation, future data revi-
sions will be predictable, and data revisions reduce measurement error, 
but each data release is not an optimal forecast of future data releases. 
For example, we know that there is a strong correlation between GDP 
data and employment data. If the government reports the GDP data 
SOURCE: Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia.
Figure 2.3  Real Output Growth for 1977, Quarter 1 (as viewed from the 
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based on its sample of the elements of GDP but ignores the information 
contained in the employment data, then its data release will contain 
measurement error, and data revisions will reduce noise. If I were a 
forecaster interested in predicting future data revisions, I would look 
at the data on employment and form a forecast of future GDP releases 
using a model combining the data from the GDP release and the data 
from the employment release. Such a forecast would be a better forecast 
of future releases of GDP than the government’s release of GDP data.
This discussion raises a key question: should the government use 
the limited source data that it knows, combined with other informa-
tion such as data on employment and industrial production, to form an 
optimal forecast of GDP? Or should the government follow a simple 
rule to fi ll in its missing data on forecasts of GDP and produce a noisy 
measure, ignoring data on other variables? You might think that the 
fi rst method would be preferable, which seems intuitively clear. But 
the danger is that once you start forecasting with extraneous variables, 
since forecasting is more of an art than a science, the data releases for 
GDP will become very subjective. As an employee of a government 
Table 2.2  Five-Year Average Annual Growth Rate of Real Output across 
Vintages
Vintage 1975 1980 1985 1991 1995 1999 2003 2009 2010
Five-year period
’49Q4 to ’54Q4 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
’ 54Q4 to ’59Q4 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
’59Q4 to ’64Q4 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3
’64Q4 to ’69Q4 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
’69Q4 to ’74Q4 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
’74Q4 to ’79Q4  3.7 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.9
’79Q4 to ’84Q4   2.2 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.5
’84Q4 to ’89Q4    3.2 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.5
’89Q4 to ’94Q4     2.3 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.5
’94Q4 to ’99Q4       3.9 4.0 4.1
’99Q4 to ’04Q4         2.2 2.4
’04Q4 to ’09Q4         1.2
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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statistical agency, you then open yourself up to the criticism that you 
are manipulating the data for political means. On the other hand, if you 
follow standard and well-established procedures for fi lling in missing 
data, you avoid any possibility of people thinking that you are manipu-
lating the data for political reasons, because anyone can replicate your 
results, even though your data releases are not optimal forecasts of later 
data releases. In this situation, noise trumps news.
FORECASTING
How does a forecaster produce optimal forecasts in real time? 
First, any forecaster needs good data; a forecast is only as good as the 
data used to generate the forecast. The literature on forecasting mainly 
focuses on model development—trying to build a better forecasting 
model, especially comparing forecasts from a new model to other mod-
els or to forecasts made in real time.4 
The fi rst question in this literature is, “Are data revisions large 
enough to affect forecasts in a meaningful way?” We have seen that 
data revisions may be substantial, but what is the impact of those revi-
sions on forecasts? Stark and Croushore (2002) suggest three ways this 
can occur: 1) by changing the data that are input into a model; 2) by 
changing the coeffi cient estimates of the model; and 3) by changing the 
structure of a model, such as changing the number of lags that provide 
the model’s best fi t. Stark and Croushore (2002) illustrate these ideas 
using repeated observation forecasting (ROF), which uses different 
real-time data vintages for the same sample period to see how fore-
casts change as the vintage of the data changes. By running these ROFs 
allowing changes in the lags in the model, allowing coeffi cient esti-
mates to change, and changing vintages, we can observe all three ways 
in which forecasts change. To isolate which reason is the main cause of 
changes in the forecasts, we can run another set of ROFs that keeps the 
number of lags unchanged. A comparison of the baseline result and this 
one reveals the importance of changes in the lag structure in the model. 
To isolate the effect of changes in parameter estimates, we can keep the 
parameter estimates fi xed and generate forecasts based on the different 
vintages of data, to see how much the forecasts are affected by param-
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eter changes. Everything else must be due to changes in the data input 
into the model. Looking at the literature on forecasting with real-time 
data reveals no broad, general tendency. For some variables and for 
some forecasting methods, the forecasts change signifi cantly because 
of data revisions. However, other variables and forecasting methods are 
more robust to data revisions, as Croushore (forthcoming) shows. 
Because data revisions have mixed effects on forecasts, we might 
ask, “Is there an optimal method for forecasters to adjust their forecasts 
in the face of data uncertainty?” This is a much more diffi cult ques-
tion to answer, and there have not been very many research papers that 
have tried to tackle it. A few papers seem to fi nd some degree of abil-
ity to improve forecasts by accounting for data revisions (see Koenig, 
Dolmas, and Piger 2003), but the predictability of data revisions is fairly 
small, and larger forecasting gains may be found by pursuing aspects of 
modeling other than modeling data revisions. Some researchers model 
data revisions with time-series models, but the evidence in Croushore 
and Stark (2001) suggests that this will be problematic because bench-
mark revisions cannot be characterized as autoregressive moving aver-
age (ARMA) models, and benchmark revisions are the most signifi cant 
type of data revisions. This explains why sophisticated fi ltering methods 
and state-space models often fail to deliver improvements in forecasts.
In summary, forecasters face diffi cult issues in forecasting in real 
time in the face of data revisions. It is not clear that the payoff to opti-
mally handling data revisions exceeds the benefi ts of working on other 
aspects of forecast modeling, especially if data revisions are diffi cult to 
predict, as is generally the case.
APPLICATION: FORECASTING IN THE 1990s
To illustrate real-time forecasting problems, I will demonstrate with 
a real-life example from my own forecasting experience at the Federal 
Reserve. This example uses forecasts from the SPF to show the effects 
of data revisions. In the 1990s, the tech boom provided an unexpected 
burst of productivity, increasing output growth, reducing the unemploy-
ment rate, and causing forecasters to rethink key aspects of their mod-
els. In this section, I will look at the forecast errors made in the 1990s 
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and show how forecasters eventually caught up to the change in produc-
tivity growth, although it took some time.
In my analysis, I will look at one-year-ahead forecasts of various 
macroeconomic variables. Each of the SPF forecasts is made in the 
middle of the quarter, shortly after the fi rst release of the GDP data for 
the previous quarter. After that, data revisions occur once a year for data 
over the past three years, and benchmark revisions every fi ve years or 
so cause signifi cant data revisions for many years’ worth of data.
Forecasts for real GDP growth made in the mid-1990s were wrong 
for many years in a row (Figure 2.4). The forecasters had expected real 
GDP growth to be just a bit over 2 percent for those years, and it turned 
out to be double that number. Forecasters were slow to realize that the 
tech boom had brought a persistently high growth rate of productiv-
ity, which translated directly into higher GDP growth. After persistent 
forecast errors from 1996 to 1998, the forecasters began to raise their 
forecasts for GDP growth in 2000. By 2001, the forecasts called for 
GDP growth close to 3 percent, just in time for the tech bubble to burst, 
driving GDP growth substantially lower as the United States experi-
enced a mild recession.
With GDP growth occurring much faster than the forecasters 
expected, you might think that infl ation would be higher than the fore-
casters thought, but in fact the opposite was true (Figure 2.5). Because 
the source of the increase in GDP growth was productivity growth, this 
was a classic supply shock, causing faster real GDP growth and slower 
growth of the price level. So the forecasters were again persistently 
incorrect in their infl ation forecasts from the early 1990s until the end 
of 1999. They thought that output was above potential output, so they 
kept thinking that infl ation would rise in the future. But in fact the fore-
casters had pegged potential output too low, and infl ation fell almost 
continuously throughout the decade. 
For the most part, the forecast errors on real GDP growth translated 
into errors in unemployment forecasts (Figure 2.6). The stronger-than-
anticipated growth of GDP meant that the unemployment rate would 
decline more than was forecast, to be sure. But the forecasters were 
also very unsure of what the natural rate of unemployment was. Several 
years after the economic recovery from the 1990–1991 recession, they 
thought the unemployment rate might have bottomed out at 5.5 percent. 
But the tech boom kept the demand for workers growing throughout 
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SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.






















Figure 2.5  Infl ation (GDP Price Index) Forecasts and Actuals
SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal 
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the decade, and the forecasters were wrong almost continuously that 
decade. They gradually ratcheted down their view of the natural rate of 
unemployment, but they were always behind the curve until the 2001 
recession.
In describing these forecast errors, I have used a data set of vintage 
November 2001, which could be deceptive because of data revisions. In 
real time, the forecasters did not see the line labeled “Actual” that I have 
shown in these charts. Rather, they observed early releases of the data, 
which may have looked quite different. So, the forecasts in Figures 2.4, 
2.5, and 2.6 look pretty bad, as they clearly made severe and persistent 
errors. But, if you knew only what the forecasters knew at the time they 
made their forecasts, the forecast errors would not have looked as bad, 
which is why the forecasters were slow to adjust their methods. For 
example, Figure 2.7 shows the same data as Figure 2.4 for real GDP 
growth forecasts but adds in a line labeled “Real-time actual” showing 
at each date what the last data point looked like when the forecast-
ers made their forecasts. Of course, because these are one-year-ahead 
forecasts, the forecasters are always a year behind, so they still appear 
to make persistent forecast errors. But the “Real-time actual” line is 
Figure 2.6  Unemployment Rate Forecasts and Actuals 
SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal 
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generally closer to the forecast line than is the “Actual” line. The point 
is, of course, that the forecasters did not know how severe their forecast 
errors were in real time; they only realized it much later.
Another way to see how slow the forecasters were to change their 
outlook is in their long-term forecasts for real output growth. The SPF 
forecasters are asked to provide a forecast for average real GDP growth 
for the next 10 years. As Figure 2.8 shows, the forecasters seemed to 
be reluctant to change their views about real GDP growth in the future, 
despite persistent real GDP growth rates of about 4 percent throughout 
the second half of the 1990s. In fact, the forecasters had lowered their 
forecasts of real GDP growth over the coming decade in 1996, just as 
the productivity boom was starting. They fi nally changed their view in 
2000 and 2001, just as a mild recession was beginning.
CONCLUSION
Forecasters face a diffi cult task in real time. As we have seen, data 
revisions can wreak havoc with forecasts. As the example from the 
1990s shows, when structural change occurs in the economy, it may 
take forecasters a long time to adjust their models. That situation is 
exacerbated when data are revised and the initial releases of the data are 
much different from the later data, as was the case with real GDP growth 
in the second half of the 1990s. The key to good forecasting is prob-
ably the use of judgment, rather than technical expertise. In the 1990s, 
some forecasters recognized the permanent (or at least persistent) shift 
in productivity growth, including Fed chairman Alan Greenspan. The SPF 
forecasts took a long time to catch up to the productivity boom, but 
some individual forecasters performed much better.
If you want to become a real-time forecaster, you should think 
about major elements of your model, such as the growth rate of poten-
tial output (and the growth rate of productivity) and the natural rate of 
unemployment. If you can make a better guess about changes in these 
variables over time, you can outperform forecasters who have greater 
technical expertise. But every forecaster, no matter how talented, will 
have trouble dealing with data revisions, which are largely unforecast-
able, and which can make forecast errors surprisingly large.
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Figure 2.7  Real GDP Growth Forecasts and Real-Time Actuals
SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal 



















Figure 2.8  Real GDP: 10-Year Forecasts 
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Notes
1. http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-
professional-forecasters/ (accessed January 21, 2011).
2. See Croushore (2010) for more details on the data shown here.
3. See my Web page at https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~dcrousho/data.htm for 
links to all of  these data sets.
4. In this section, I will report the main results in two survey papers, Croushore 
(2006) and Croushore (forthcoming).
References
Ball, Laurence, and Dean Croushore. 2003. “Expectations and the Effects of 
Monetary Policy.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 35(4): 473–484.
Croushore, Dean. 2006. “Forecasting with Real-Time Macroeconomic Data.” 
In Handbook of Economic Forecasting, Vol. 1, Graham Elliott, Clive W.J. 
Granger, and Allan Timmermann, eds. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 
961–982.
———. 2010. “An Evaluation of Infl ation Forecasts from Surveys Using Real-
Time Data.” B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 10(1): Article 10.
———. Forthcoming. “Forecasting with Real-Time Data Vintages.” In Oxford 
Handbook of Economic Forecasting, Michael P. Clements and David F. 
Hendry, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Croushore, Dean, and Tom Stark. 2000. “A Funny Thing Happened on the Way 
to the Data Bank: A Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review 26(September/October): 
15–27. 
———. 2001. “A Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists.” Journal of 
Econometrics 105(1): 111–130.
Koenig, Evan F., Sheila Dolmas, and Jeremy Piger. 2003. “The Use and Abuse 
of Real-Time Data in Economic Forecasting.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 85(3): 618–628.
Stark, Tom. 2010. Realistic Evaluation of Real-Time Forecasts in the Survey 
of Professional Forecasters. Research Rap Special Report. Philadelphia: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Stark, Tom, and Dean Croushore. 2002. “Forecasting with a Real-Time Data 
Set for Macroeconomists.” Journal of Macroeconomics 24(4): 507–531.
up11mhaiefch2.indd   24 11/17/2011   2:57:48 PM
